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Repelling	Neoliberal	World-making?	How	the	Ageing-Dementia	Relation	is	Reassembling	the	Social	
	
Joanna	Latimer	
Department	of	Sociology,	University	of	York.	
		
Abstract	
Growing	 old	 ‘badly’	 is	 stigmatizing,	 a	 truism	 that	 is	 enrolled	 into	 contemporary	 agendas	 for	 the	
biomedicalization	of	ageing.	Among	the	many	discourses	that	emphasize	ageing	as	the	root	cause	of	
later	 life	 illnesses,	 dementia	 is	 currently	 promoted	 as	 an	 epidemic	 and	 such	 hyperbole	 serves	 to	
legitimate	its	increasing	biomedicalization.	The	new	stigma	however	is	no	longer	contained	to	simply	
having	 dementia,	 it	 is	 failing	 to	 prevent	 it.	 Anti-ageing	 cultures	 of	 consumption,	 alongside	 a	
proliferation	of	cultural	depictions	of	the	ageing-dementia	relation,	seem	to	be	refiguring	dementia	
as	a	future	to	be	worked	on	to	eliminate	it	from	our	everyday	life.		The	paper	unpacks	this	complexity	
for	 how	 the	 ageing-dementia	 relation	 is	 being	 reassembled	 in	 biopolitics	 in	 ways	 that	 enact	 it	 as	
something	 that	 can	 be	 transformed	 and	managed.	 Bringing	 together	 Bauman’s	 (2001)	 theories	 of	
how	cultural	communities	cope	with	the	otherness	of	the	other	with	theories	of	the	rationale	for	the	
making	of	monsters	 -	 such	as	 the	 figure	of	 the	 abject	older	person	with	dementia	 -	 I	 suggest	 that	
those	older	body-persons	that	personify	the	ageing-dementia	relation,	depicted	in	film	and	television	
for	 example,	 are	 ‘the	 Sacra’	 (Turner,	 1967)	 that	 threaten	 the	 modes	 of	 ordering	 underpinning	
contemporary	 lives.	 	 This	 is	 not	 just	 because	 they	 intimate	 loss	 of	 mind,	 or	 because	 they	 are	
disruptive,	 but	 because	 they	 do	 not	 perform	what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 ‘response-able’	 and	 postpone	 frailty	
through	managing	self	and	risk.			
	
Introduction	
	
In	this	paper	I	examine	the	social	and	existential	significance	of	an	emergent	biopolitics	around	the	
ageing-dementia	relation	and	argue	that	this	politics	represents	a	shift	from	emic	to	phagic	strategies	
for	 incorporating,	assimilating	and	transforming	the	Otherness	that	 the	ageing-dementia	relation	 is	
made	to	 represent.	 	Specifically,	 the	play	upon	the	negative	and	stigmatizing	effects	and	affects	of	
the	 ageing-dementia	 relation	 runs	 alongside	 intense	 media,	 neuro-cultural	 and	 public	 health	
discourses	 that	 emphasize	 how	 ageing,	 and	 specifically	 dementia,	 are	 plastic	 and	 malleable,	 and	
critically,	if	not	preventable,	manageable	and	postponeable.	
	
Public	 health	policy	worldwide	 represents	Alzheimer’s	Disease,	 hereafter	AD,	 as	not	only	wrecking	
individual	 lives,	but	as	a	global	 ‘epidemic’	 that	 threatens	 the	 social	order	 (e.g.	Alzheimer’s	Disease	
International	2013).	Most	recently	it	has	been	claimed	by	the	UK’s	Office	for	National	Statistics	that	
AD	and	dementia	has	become	the	major	cause	of	death	 in	England	and	Wales	(Siddique	2016).	 	As	
Greengross	 (2014)	 suggests,	 the	double	 jeopardy	of	ageing	when	 it	 is	 associated	with	dementia,	 is	
doubly	stigmatizing:	
	
We	know	in	many	societies	that	there	are	strong	associations	with	ageing	and	stigma	and	for	
those	with	dementia,	it	seems	many	are	subject	to	a	‘double	jeopardy’.	While	this	stigma	to	a	
degree	 is	 acknowledged	 and	 recognised	 in	 some	 communities,	 we	 still	 have	 much	 to	
understand	 about	 why	 dementia	 remains	 outside	 the	 realm	 of	 acceptable	 everyday	
conversation	even	as	the	profile	of	dementia	rises.	(p.6)	
	
The	stigma	of	what	I	am	calling	the	ageing-dementia	relation	has	become	such	a	truism	that	recent	
research	suggests	doctors	charged	with	early	detection	of	dementia	are	reluctant	to	give	someone	a	
dementia	 diagnosis	 because	 of	 its	 existential	 potency	 and	 potential	 for	 discrimination	 (Gove	 et	 al,	
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2015).	As	Margaret	Lock	(2014)	asserts,	Alzheimer’s	and	other	Alzheimer-like	dementias	personify	all	
that	is	most	feared	about	growing	old,	a	fear	widely	expressed	in	research	on	ageing	and	experiences	
of	 ageing	 (e.g.	 Balzagette	 et	 al,	 2011).	 This	 fear	 is	 crystallized	 in	 associating	 the	 dementia-ageing	
relation	with	the	hollowing	out	of	personhood	(Halewood,	2016;	Katz	&	Peters,	2008;	Kontos,	2005),	
and	with	representing	it	as	‘a	living	death’	(Behuniak,	2011).		Behuniak	goes	so	far	as	to	argue	that	it	
is	the	social	construction	of	those	with	AD	as	zombies	that:		
	
	.	.	generates	not	only	negative	stereotypes	and	stigma	associated	with	people	constructed	as	
‘other’,	 but	 also	 the	 emotional	 responses	 of	 disgust	 and	 utter	 terror.	 It	 is	 this	 politics	 of	
revulsion	and	fear	that	directly	infuses	the	discourse	about	AD	and	shapes	it	(ibid.	p.	72).	
	
Stigma	is	not	an	inherent	quality	of	some	aged	and/or	ill	persons	–	it	is	a	relation.	In	Goffman	(1963)	
stigmatization,	 including	 processes	 of	 discrimination,	 occurs	when	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 fit	 between	 a	
body-person	and	the	worlds	of	others	by	which	they	find	themselves	marginalized.	Inasmuch	as	they	
have	difficulty	 in	passing	as	 ‘one	of	us’,	 their	 identity	 is	despoiled.	As	Twigg	(2000)	amongst	others	
has	asserted,	the	ageing	body	can	be	experienced	as	disgusting	and	repulsive	because	it	represents	
deviation	from	what	is	most	cherished	in	modernity	and	contemporary	preoccupations	with	specific	
forms	of	personhood:	
	
Modern	individualism	rests	on	the	construction	of	persons	as	self-contained,	bounded	entities.		
Incontinence	 and	 bodily	 disintegration	 threaten	 this	 .	 .	 Smell	 and	 disintegration	 undermine	
individualistic	constructions	of	the	person	as	stable,	bounded	and	autonomous.	(Pp.	396-7)	
	
Moreover,	 the	 parade	of	 ‘monsters’	 (Canguilhem,	 2008)	 or	 ‘revolting	 subjects’	 (Tyler,	 2013)	which	
invoke	‘social	disgust’	(Lawler	2005)	should	not	be	understood	merely	as	responses	to	the	breach	in	
the	social	order	that	older	persons	with	dementia	invoke.	Rather	proliferating	media	representations	
of	 older	 people	 with	 dementia	 are	 created	 spectacles	 of	 ‘othering’	 that	 reaffirm	 the	 values	 and	
modes	of	 ordering	 that	 underpin	 dominant	 forms	of	world-making.	What	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 feelings	 of	
social	 disgust	 and	 the	making	 of	monsters	 is	 the	 very	 production	 and	 reproduction	 of	 values	 and	
moral	 forms.	 	 In	 some	 respects,	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 demented	 older	 person	 resembles	 the	 Sacra	
(Turner,	1967)	–	figures,	whose	potency	is	exaggerated	by	their	magnification,	and	which	are	paraded	
in	order	to	impress	those	who	see	them.	And	yet,	in	the	case	of	dementia,	monsters	are	figures	that	
somehow	contravene	what	is	most	sacred.	Growing	old	badly,	especially	growing	old	with	dementia,	
thus	 can	 be	 made	 to	 represent	 a	 deviant	 act	 –	 forms	 of	 otherness	 that	 are	 punishable	 by	
stigmatization	and	isolation	(Schmidt,	2011)	–	because	it	contravenes	what	is	most	cherished.		
	
Bauman	 (2001),	 drawing	 upon	 Levi-Strauss,	 suggests	 that	 there	 are	 two	 ways	 of	 coping	 with	 the	
otherness	 of	 others:	 the	 strategies	 known	 as	 the	 emic	 (anthropoemic)	 and	 the	 phagic	
(anthropophagic).		While	phagic	strategies	involve	assimilation	of	some	kind,	the	emic	consists	of:		
	
	.	 .	 	 'vomiting',	 spitting	 out	 the	 others	 seen	 as	 incurably	 strange	 and	 alien:	 barring	 physical	
contact,	 dialogue,	 social	 intercourse	 and	 all	 varieties	 of	 commercium,	 commensality	 or	
connubium.	(Bauman,	2001:	)	
	
In	 the	context	of	ageing,	 the	abject	demented	older	person	represents	someone	who	 is	being	spat	
out	on	the	basis	of	seeming	incurably	strange	and	alien:	
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	.	 .	 personal	 losses	 and	 interpersonal	 ravages	 .	 .	 replete	 with	 cliched	 metaphors	 and	
representations	in	which	Alzheimer’s	is	characteristically	drawn	in	colourfully	dramatic	terms	
that	paint	vividly	disturbing	images	of	a	monstrous	disease’’	(Herskovits,	1995:	152).		
	
Such	monsters,	have	to	be	‘sequestrated’	(Giddens,	1991)	–	hidden	away,	contained.		Social	disgust	
and	the	creation	of	revolting	subjects	remain	social	processes	of	othering:	processes	in	which	there	is	
a	moral	demand	to	 ‘efface	 the	 face’	 (Bauman,	1990;	Latimer,	1997),	and	which	pivots	around	how	
this	‘other’	is	no	longer	fully	human.		
	
In	 what	 follows,	 I	 show	 how	 the	 creation	 of	 monsters,	 such	 as	 that	 bodied	 forth	 by	 the	 ageing-
dementia	relation,	form	the	background	against	which	dominant	versions	of	what	it	is	to	age	well	are	
being	performed.	 I	go	on	 to	suggest	 that	 there	 is	currently	a	global	 reassembling	of	 the	dementia-
ageing	 relation	 that	 –	 as	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 it	 normalizes	 the	 stigmatizing	 effects	 and	 affects	 of	
dementia	–	 it	can	also	be	understood	as	a	second	strategy	available	 in	 the	 face	of	breaches	to	the	
social	 order.	What	 Bauman	 calls	 the	 phagic	 (anthropophagic	 strategy)	 aims	 at	 the	 assimilation	 of	
otherness.	So,	rather	than	try	to	exile	the	other,	this	second	strategy	consists	in:		
	
	.	 .	 ’ingesting',	 'devouring'	 foreign	 bodies	 and	 spirits	 so	 that	 they	 may	 be	 made,	 through	
metabolism,	identical	with,	and	no	more	distinguishable,	from	the	'ingesting'	body.	(Bauman,	
2001:24)		
	
In	the	context	of	the	relation	between	ageing	and	dementia,	and	the	prediction	that	1	in	4	of	us	will	
become	 demented	 by	 the	 time	 we	 are	 80,	 emic	 strategies	 alone	 are	 no	 longer	 feasible.	 	 This	 is	
particularly	so	in	the	context	of	a	current	political	climate	designed	to	reduce	rather	than	expand	the	
state	supported	care	sector.		It	is	not	just	that	there	are	not	enough	‘asylums’	to	go	around,	there	are	
going	 to	 be	 less	 and	 less	 places	 of	 refuge	 and	 care	 for	 a	 supposedly	 growing	 population	 of	 older	
people	figured	as	potential	‘bedblockers’	(see	also	Skeggs,	2016).			
	
My	original	research	focused	on	‘bedblocking’	(Latimer,	1997,	1999,	2000a	and	b)	as	a	critical	site:	it	
illuminated	the	boundary	work	and	struggles	around	those	older	people	who	have	an	acute	episode	
of	 illness	 and	 are	 admitted	 to	 acute	 health	 services,	 but	 whose	 troubles	 can	 be	 marked	 as	
inappropriate	for	health	care,	with	their	needs	redefined	as	‘personal’	and/or	‘social’.		That	study	was	
in	the	1990’s.		The	availability	of	care	and	support	in	hospitals,	residential	homes,	or	in	the	home,	is	
even	more	 problematic	 in	 post-welfare	 societies	 (see	 for	 example	 the	 essays	 in	 Ceci	 et	 al,	 2011),	
creating	even	greater	problems	over	who	or	what	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	care	and	 support	of	older	
people,	especially	older	people	with	dementia.		Under	these	conditions,	the	stigma	of	the	dementia-
ageing	relation	 is	being	 intensified,	especially	when	older	people	are	associated	with	care	reduced,	
over	 and	 over	 again,	 to	 its	 economic	 costs	 (see	 figure	 4	 which	 illustrates	 how	 dementia	 is	 being	
figured	 in	 term	of	 its	 costs	–	 there	are	many,	many	more).	 	Being	old,	demented	and	costly,	 then,	
potentiates	the	stigma	of	the	dementia-ageing	relation.				
	
Thus,	alongside	the	making	of	monsters,	associations	between	different	domains	in	which	dementia	
is	being	reconstructed	mean	that	dementia	increasingly	haunts	the	public	imagination,	including	the	
endless	 evocation	 to	 age	 well	 instead	 of	 badly.	 Through	 modes	 of	 prevention,	 including	
technoscientific	 interventions,	 the	 goal	 is	 always	 to	 transform,	 even	 annihilate	 the	 ‘foreign	 bodies	
and	spirits’	that	dementia	represents.		In	contrast	to	the	literature	that	objects	to	the	medicalization	
of	ageing	and	of	dementia,	the	genealogy	here	suggests	that	biomedicalization	is	not	just	helping	to	
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partially	deactivate	stigma	(see	for	example,	Macrae,	1999;	Seale,	1999)	but	 is	helping	to	assemble	
new	social	formations	(e.g.	Bond,	1992)	through	which	to	assimilate	and	transform	dementia1.		
	
I	begin	with	analysis	of	a	short	film	about	Gladys	Wilson	and	Naomi	Feil	that	as	at	the	same	time	as	it	
appears	 to	parade	 the	abject	older	person	with	dementia	as	all	 that	 is	most	 feared	about	growing	
old,	 also	 helps	 reveal	 a	 conundrum	 deep	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 dementia-ageing	 relation	 and	
possibilities	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 social	 relations	 through	 which	 to	 reassimilate	 the	 ageing-
dementia	 relation.	 	 I	go	on	 to	show	how	the	contemporary	dominant	classification	of	 ‘ageing	well’	
rests	upon	complex	associations.	The	widespread	enactment	of	dominant	notions	of	what	counts	as	
successful	ageing	(including	prolonged	productivity,	heightened	activity,	self-determination,	mastery	
of	information	technologies,	competition	of	all	kinds,	youthful	vigor	and	glowing	health)	act	as	valued	
forms	 of	 personhood	 alongside	 actor-networks	 of	 public	 health,	 biomedicine,	 neuroscience	 and	
cultures	of	consumption	that	are	bringing	ageing	and	dementia	 into	being	as	a	bioscientific	object.	
Together	they	establish	that	ageing	is	plastic,	not	inevitable;	something	to	be	transformed,	or	at	least	
have	its	worst	ravages	postponed.		
	
The	Old	Fools		
	
…..That	is	where	they	live:	
Not	here	and	now,	but	where	all	happened	once.	
	 	 	 This	is	why	they	give	
	
An	air	of	baffled	absence,	trying	to	be	there	
Yet	being	here.	For	the	rooms	grow	farther,	leaving	
Incompetent	cold,	the	constant	wear	and	tear	
Of	taken	breath,	and	them	crouching	below	
Extinction's	alp,	the	old	fools,	never	perceiving	
How	near	it	is.	This	must	be	what	keeps	them	quiet:	
The	peak	that	stays	in	view	wherever	we	go	
For	them	is	rising	ground.	Can	they	never	tell	
What	is	dragging	them	back,	and	how	it	will	end?	Not	at	night?	
Not	when	the	strangers	come?	Never,	throughout	
The	whole	hideous	inverted	childhood?	Well,	
We	shall	find	out.		 	 	
(Larkin,	1973,	The	Old	Fools	in	High	Windows)		
	
Media	representations	of	dementia	proliferate	(Swinnen	&	Schweda,	2015).	They	show	us	monsters	
                                                
1	In	this	paper	I	am	drawing	on	my	ethnographic	study	of	biology	and	ageing,	which	began	in	
2009	with	a	study	funded	by	the	RCUK	New	Dynamics	of	Ageing	Program	entitled	Ageing	&	
Biology	(see	also	Cox	et	al,	2014),	a	series	of	small	grants	awarded	by	Cardiff	University	&	the	
ESCRC	Centre	for	the	Social	and	Economic	Aspects	of	Genetics	(CESAGEN)	and	a	Welcome	Trust	
Project	(with	Alex	Hillman)	on	Alzheimer’s	Disease	and	memory	clinics	as	well	as	cultural	
representations	of	dementia	(Hillman	and	Latimer,	2017).		This	research	has	included	
interviews	and	site	visits	with	scientists	across	the	UK	&	the	US,	participant	observation	at	
conferences	on	ageing;	ongoing	conversations	with	different	scientists,	clinicians	and	
neuroscientists;	participant	observation	at	memory	clinics,	as	well	as	analysis	of	publically	
available	representations	of	ageing,	biology	and	dementia.				
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as	at	 the	 same	 time	as	 they	are	making	 the	experience	of	 the	dementia-ageing	 relation	more	and	
more	present	in	everyday	lives	(Carbonelle,	et	al.	2009).	Martin	et	al	(2013)	suggest	that:		
	
	.	 .	 films	 generate	 certain	 feelings	 about	 dementia	which	 then	 become	part	 of	 our	 popular	
understanding	 and	 approach	 to	 persons	 living	 with	 dementia.	 Indeed,	 they	 potentially	
become	part	of	how	people	with	dementia	come	to	see	themselves	as	they	draw	upon	such	
films	as	a	cultural	resource	for	making	sense	of	their	condition.	(Martin	et	al,	2013,	p.	284)	
	
But	I	want	to	press	how	the	proliferation	of	books,	films,	television	dramas	and	soaps	which	include	a	
character	with	dementia	 are	helping	 to	body	 forth	dementia,	 even	give	 it	 an	existence.	As	Cohen-
Shalev	and	Marcus	(2012)	assert,	these	films	are	often	from	the	perspective	of	those	looking	in	on	a	
person	with	dementia	becoming	other,	a	stranger,	while	others	help	us	to	get	inside	the	experience	
of	 the	 person	 becoming-with	 dementia.	 Swinnen	 and	 Shweda	 (2015)	 suggest	 many	 depictions	
portray	 the	ageing-dementia	 relation	as	 an	 inevitable	process	of	decline	and	unbecoming.	 	 Recent	
examples	 are	 the	UK	 TV	 series’,	Wallander	 (BBC	2016),	 based	on	 the	 Swedish	 TV	 series,	and	 ITV’s	
(2016)	The	Missing,	both	of	which	depict	a	strong,	professional	man	who	occupies	a	senior	position	
gradually	losing	his	memory	and	his	mind,	increasingly	unable	to	work	but	attempting	to	cover	it	up,	
and	 eventually	 becoming	 fragile,	 needy	 and	 dependent.	 	 In	 The	Missing,	 the	 senior	 army	 officer,	
played	by	Roger	Allam,	has	to	be	admitted	to	a	nursing	home,	cared	for	24	hours	a	day.			These	are	
tragic	 depictions,	 the	 decline	 and	 fall	 of	 a	 big	 man,	 and	 the	 gradual	 slide	 towards	 vulnerability,	
fragility	and	becoming	a	non-person.	These	representations	of	dementia	parade	the	dementia-ageing	
relation	 unproblematically	 as	 something	 to	 be	 feared,	 as	 shameful	 and	 as	 stigmatizing.	 This	 is	 the	
dementia-ageing	monster	on	parade	–	to	be	vomited	up	and	sequestrated.			
	
But	this	picture	of	the	slide	toward	a	living	death	is	being	disturbed	by	recent	interventions,	such	as	
those	by	the	well-known	neurologist,	Oliver	Saks	(2008)	in	his	and	others’	work	on	musicophilia2.		In	
particular,	 I	 want	 to	 draw	 on	 one	 such	 intervention	 through	 analysis	 of	 a	 short	 film,	 publically	
available	 on	 Youtube,	 by	 Naomi	 Feil,	 a	 US	 based	 validation	 therapist,	 and	Michael	 Verde,	 a	 film-
maker,	about	Feil’s	encounter	with	Gladys	Wilson.			
	
At	first	we	see	Gladys	Wilson	in	a	chair	alone,	apparently	introverted	and	disconnected,	eyes	closed,	
very	thin,	but	tidy	and	clean,	sitting	in	a	wheelchair	that	has	been	made	to	seem	like	an	armchair	(fig.	
1).		She	is	sitting	alone	in	a	barren,	impersonal,	sanitized	setting.		On	a	close	up	of	Gladys’	face	it	is	
emaciated	but	 peaceful.	 	Her	 clothes	 and	 crooked	 teeth	 as	well	 as	 the	paucity	 of	 the	 institutional	
setting	indicate	Gladys	is	not	a	wealthy	woman	–	not	now	at	least.		
                                                
2		See	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tqrNEmuSCis.		In	this	video	we	see	an	older	Afro-
American	man	in	a	wheelchair	‘away’	like	Gladys,	someone	puts	headphones	on	him	and	he	literally	
comes	awake,	starts	singing	and	bopping	in	his	chair,	and	afterwards	he	becomes	perfectly	capable	of	
answering	questions	and	interacting.		We	are	told	the	music	is	hearing	is	a	composite	of	music	he	
liked	across	his	life.	
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Figs.	1	Gladys	Wilson,	2009,	with	kind	permission	of	Naomi	Feil	and	Michael	Verde	available	at	
https://vfvalidation.org	and	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CrZXz10FcVM)	(.	
	
We	are	told	by	Naomi	Feil,	in	the	voice-over,	that	Gladys	is	in	her	eighties	and	that	she	was	diagnosed	
with	Alzheimer’s	Disease	 (AD)	nine	years	ago,	and	now	has	 little	 language.	 	 For	many	of	us	 seeing	
Gladys	 like	 this	 represents	 our	worst	 nightmare	 about	 growing	 old	 –	 abandoned,	 institutionalized,	
forced	 to	 endure	 a	 pitiful	 life	 that	 hardly	 appears	 to	 be	 worth	 living	 –	 a	 zombie,	 even	 perhaps	
repulsive	and	disgusting	to	some	viewers.	 In	many	ways	this	 figure	of	Gladys,	co-created	by	us	the	
audience	 together	with	 Feil	 and	 her	 film	 team,	 seems	 to	 body-forth	 all	 that	 is	most	 feared	 about	
growing	old	with	dementia:	the	hollowed-out	person	in	a	state	of	‘living	death’.			
	
At	the	same	time	Gladys	seems	peaceful	even	calm.		Very	different	from	the	representations	of	the	
persons	 becoming	 demented	 depicted	 in	 films	 such	 as	Amour,	 or	 TV	 dramas,	 like	 The	Missing	 or	
Wallander	mentioned	above.		Gladys	seems	‘elsewhere’	to	the	present	reality	of	other	people.	She	is	
perhaps,	more	 or	 less,	 absent	 to	 their	 world-making:	 being	 there	 and	 not	 here,	 as	 Larkin’s	 poem	
expresses	it	in	the	citation	above.	While	this	withdrawal	may	be	due	to	her	disease,	it	may	also	be	her	
retreat,	even	a	refusal,	a	repelling:	a	sign	that	she	no	longer	wants	to	participate	in	the	social.	As	in	
‘The	Old	Fools’	 she	may	be	otherwise	engaged,	 looking	 inward	 to	 the	 fading	 rooms	and	 faces	and	
moments	 from	 her	 past	 life.	 There	may	 be	 nothing	wrong	with	 being	 in	 the	world	 like	 this.	Who	
knows?	
	
Whichever	way	we	want	to	look	at	the	film,	Naomi	Feil	takes	a	more	radical	position.	Like	Margaret	
Shlegel	 in	 Howard’s	 End	 (Forster,	 1910)	 she	 insists	 we	 should	 ‘Only	 Connect!’	 and	 stresses	 that	
Gladys,	like	everyone	else,	needs	and	wants	connection.	While	I’m	not	sure	about	the	discourse	here,	
what	I	want	to	stress	is	how	Naomi	finds	a	way	to	become	competent	in	Gladys’	world	and	connect	
with	Gladys.	What	we	 are	 shown	 is	 Naomi	 reaching	Gladys:	 by	 using	 her	 body,	 and	 her	 voice,	 by	
taking	 Gladys’	 hands,	 by	 touching	 and	 stroking	 Gladys	 face,	 by	moving	 her	 face	 into	 the	 space	 of	
Gladys’	face	and	touching	Gladys’	forehead	with	her	own	forehead,	by	singing	a	negro-spiritual	hymn	
with	her,	and	by	holding	Gladys’	hands	and	arms	and	beating	time	together	as	she	sings.	Gradually	
Gladys	opens:	her	eyes	open	and	look	into	Naomi’s	eyes,	she	holds	Naomi’s	hands,	pulling	her	in	and	
pushing	her	out	as	if	to	focus,	and	then	she	begins	to	sing	with	Naomi.			
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For	a	few	moments	Gladys-Naomi	sings	and	beats	time,	in	their	jointness	they	become	face-to-face.		
This	 is	 a	material	 semiotics	 of	 bodily	 connection	 in	 a	bodily	 becoming-with	 (Haraway,	 2008).	 Then	
they	separate	and	Gladys	seems	to	be	awakened	–	concentrating	on	Naomi,	answering	her	questions,	
making	a	choice,	having	autonomy,	being	expressive.	Naomi	seems	to	bring	Gladys	into	presence	as	
participant	in	world-making.	And	as	such	Gladys	becomes	more	than	the	living	dead,	regaining	what	
most	of	us	would	recognize	as	the	attributes	of	the	fully	human.		
	
In	the	perspective	that	the	film	unfolds	Gladys	is	refigured:	instead	of	her	inert	condition	as	we	see	it	
at	the	beginning	being	constituted	as	something	inherent	-	the	effects	of	ageing	and	AD	on	her	brain	
and	the	rest	of	her	body	-	we	can	begin	to	question	whether	her	condition	is	an	effect	of	a	body-self-
world	relation	 (Latimer,	2009),	and	perhaps	of	 the	stigmatizing	effects	and	affects	of	dementia.	An	
extraordinary	 possibility	 is	 created	 which	 has	 the	 chance	 to	 completely	 shift	 how	 we	 know	 and	
understand	Gladys	–	the	supposition	of	her	condition	being	that	of	a	‘living	death’	may	be	not	just	an	
effect	 of	 her	 degenerating	 brain,	 but	 of	 her	 emplacement	 by	 a	world	 that	 does	 not	 know	how	 to	
reach	 her?	 Or,	 indeed,	 a	 world	 that	 deliberately	 sequestrates	 her	 as	 Other.	 From	 this	 different	
perspective,	dementia	and	AD	become	distributed,	relational	and	co-created.			
	
	
Biopolitics	and	Successful	Ageing:	managing	and	self-care		
	
The	figure	of	the	abject	older	person	becoming	demented	is	invoked	in	the	legitimation	of	a	new	and	
emergent	biomedical	interest	in	ageing.	In	my	ethnography	of	biology,	medicine	and	ageing	(Cox	et	al	
2014;	Latimer,	forthcoming;	Latimer,	et	al	2011;	Latimer	&	Puig,	2013),	for	example,	the	biomedical	
scientists	I	have	interviewed	almost	always	cite	dementia	and	AD	as	the	worst	of	what	ageing	does	to	
people:	
So	you	know	the	ideal	scenario	 is	that	you	would	be	able	to	start	taking	some	tablets	when	
you	were	55	or	something	like	this	and	it	would	provide	protection	against	dementia,	against	
heart	disease,	against	diabetes,	against	you	know	the	bewildering	diversity	of	horrible	things	
that	 go	 wrong	 with	 you	 when	 you	 get	 older.	 And	 that	 would	 be	 marvelous	 (Biomedical	
Scientist	of	Ageing	interviewed	in	2010)		
	
Biomedicine	 is	 a	 dominant	 site	 of	 contemporary	 knowledge	 creation	 that	 is	 constructing	 and	
reconstructing	 ageing	 and	 death	 (Vincent,	 2008	 p.331),	 particularly	 dementia	 (Bond,	 1992).	 	 This	
process	 is	 reflected	 in	 worldwide	 programs	 that	 are	 medicalizing	 ageing	 by	 posing	 ageing	 as	 a	
challenge	because	of	links	between	ageing,	chronic	illness,	disability	and	the	increasing	need	for	care	
(United	 Nations,	 2013;	 Vos	 et	 al,	 2008).	 Problems	 that	 get	 highlighted	 include	 the	 prevalence	 of	
multiple	 forms	of	 illness	 associated	with	 later	 life	 (e.g.	Barnet	et	 al,	 2012;	DOH,	2014;	Kings	 Fund,	
2012),	 especially,	 as	 I	 have	 already	 indicated,	 AD	 and	 dementia.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 biomedicine	
intensifies	 the	 reorganization	 of	 health	 care	 not	 just	 around	 technological	 intervention	 but,	
increasingly,	around	modes	of	prevention	and	consumption	(Clarke	et	al.,	2010;	see	also	Kaufman	et	
al.,	2006).	This	 is	 important	 to	note	as	an	aspect	of	 the	political	economy	of	dementia,	 referred	to	
above	in	relation	to	‘bedblocking’	and	the	discourse	of	crisis	in	health	and	social	care.		This	crisis	party	
constructed	 around	 an	 idea	 that	 'we	 cannot	 afford	 dementia'	 which	 is	 of	 course	 partly	 what	 is	
stigmatising	about	it.	Within	this	perspective	the	stigma	associated	with	the	dementia-ageing	relation	
is	 not	 just	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 political	 regime,	 it	 is	 helping	 to	 legitimate	 the	 biomedicalization	 of	
ageing,	 in	general,	and	of	dementia,	 in	particular.	 	 In	 the	context	of	 so-called	 ‘greying	populations’	
and	the	associations	between	ageing,	multi-morbidity	and	the	proliferation	of	chronic	and	disabling	
disease	in	later	life,	ageing	has	rapidly	become	not	just	a	policy	‘problem’	to	be	managed	(Balzagette	
et	 al	 2011),	 but,	 as	Binstock	 et	 al	 (2006)	 suggest,	 an	exemplar	 scientific	 site	 for	 understanding	 ‘all	
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enhancement	 technologies’.	 Specifically,	 knowledge	 practices	 and	 governmental	 processes	 that	
position	 life	as	an	object	of	power	 in	contemporary	capitalist	societies	can	be	understood	as	being	
played	 out	 around	 what	 constitutes	 ageing	 well	 or	 badly	 (Neilson	 2012),	 especially	 the	 causes	 of	
different	ageing	trajectories.		
	
The	important	questions,	for	economies,	persons,	families	and	communities	is	not	mortality	-	we	are	
living	 longer	 than	 we	 have	 ever	 done	 -	 but	 how	 and	 when	 will	 we	 age.	 	 Globalization,	
individualization,	 labour	 market	 de-regulation	 and	 re-structuration	 of	 public	 services	 (Beck,	 2000;	
Higgs	and	 Jones,	2009;	Kohli,	2007)	alongside	 increased	 longevity	have	worked	 to	produce	what	 is	
sometimes	labelled	a	de-standardized	life	course	(Bruckner	and	Mayer,	2005),	including	imaginaries	
of	 more	 fluid,	 post-modern	 life	 trajectories	 (Hockey	 and	 James	 2002;	 Turner	 2009)	 that	 extend	
‘middle	age’	well	into	latter	life.		This	fluidity	is	reflected	in	increasing	emphases	in	health	and	social	
policy	 on	 finding	 ways	 to	 prolong	 productivity	 and	 employability	 (e.g.	 Department	 of	 Work	 and	
Pensions	 2005)	 especially	 a	 ‘third	 age’	 (Lazlett	 1989)	 of	 activity,	 youthfulness	 and	 health	
(Featherstone	&	Hepworth	1993),	with	baby-boomer	hopes	and	aspirations	 for	 ‘timelessness’	 (Katz	
2005),	 and	 an	 endless	 life	 of	 consumption	 and	 choice	 (Turner	 2009).	 How	 people	 age	 is	 thus	 no	
longer	being	seen	as	the	‘natural	and	inevitable	occurrence	of	growing	old’	(Butler	2001–2002,	p.	64),	
but	 as	 something	 that	 is	 plastic	 and	 malleable	 (Moreira	 and	 Palladino	 2008)	 and	 available	 to	
enhancement	(Binstock	2003,	Binstock	et	al	2006).		
	
These	 biomedical	 and	 public	 health	 discourses	 are,	 however,	 simultaneously	 circulating	 dominant	
versions	 of	 ‘successful’	 ageing,	 which	 are	 underpinned	 by	 specific	 notions	 of	 value	 –	 keeping	
productive,	 independent,	 fit	 and	 healthy,	 including	 managing	 risk.	 Rowe	 and	 Kahn	 (1997),	 for	
example,	state	that	the	concept	‘successful	ageing’	has	its	roots	in	the	1950s,	was	popularized	in	the	
1980s,	with	‘success’	classified	in	terms	of	three	features:	low	probability	of	disease	or	disability;	high	
cognitive	and	physical	 functional	capacity;	and	active	engagement	with	 life.	While	the	 life	course	 is	
being	 reimagined	 as	more	 and	more	 fluid,	 possibilities	 for	 successful	 ageing	 are	 increasingly	 being	
individualized	and	 reconstructed	as	a	problem	of	 self-care	and	self-management	of	 risk	 (Hepworth	
1995;	Neilson	2008)	on	the	one	hand,	and	as	available	to	techno-scientific	manipulation	on	the	other	
(Mykytyn	 2010).	 Human	 ageing	 is	 thus	 being	 reimagined	 as	 increasingly	 subject	 to	 reflexive	
management	and	manipulation,	including	a	new	age	of	consumers	striving	to	age	positively,	including	
the	incitement	of	a	rational	practice	of	designing	one’s	own	lifecourse	through	consumption	of	‘anti-
ageing’	technology,	products	and	activities	(Schweda	&	Pfaller	2014).		
	
These	discourses	of	successful	ageing	thus	enact	what	it	is	to	be	a	full	person	and	a	good	consumer	in	
late	modern	capitalism.	Furthermore,	‘ageing’	as	a	target	to	be	managed	resembles	the	most	sacred	
of	 ‘public	 secrets’	 (Taussig	 1999).	 	 Not	 only	 must	 everyone	 age	 and	 die	 (eventually)	 but	 opening	
ageing	up	as	a	site	of	enhancement	creates	opportunities	for	the	enactment	of	what	is	most	valued	
and	precious	 in	neoliberal	 forms	of	modernity	–	 to	have	a	 ‘future’	and	be	 ‘ready	and	available’	 for	
whenever	the	call	to	do	this	or	that	comes	along	(Latimer	&	Munro	2015).		The	call	here	is	to	manage	
aging	 successfully.	More	 specifically,	 after	 Skeggs	 (2011),	 ageing	 bodies	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 bodies	 of	
value	when	they	body-forth	the	effects	and	affects	of	managing	ageing	well.			
	
The	markers	and	signifiers	of	successful	ageing	thus	go	beyond	just	health,	fitness	and	engagement,		
and	 involve	 enactment	 of	 active	 engagement	 in	 managing	 ageing.	 Hepworth	 and	 Featherstone	
(1993)	 in	 their	 ground	 breaking	 work	 on	 representations	 of	 ageing,	 written	 at	 the	 advent	 of	 the	
current	 form	of	capitalism	we	are	experiencing	today,	helped	to	 illuminate	this	 shift	 in	possibilities	
around	what	 it	 is	 to	 age	well.	 Through	 an	 examination	 of	 ‘Retirement	Magazine’	 they	 analyze	 the	
emergence	 of	 a	 new	 discourse	 with	 its	 front	 cover	 images	 not	 just	 exemplifying	 a	 discourse	 of	
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successful	ageing,	but	as	helping	to	construct	it.		
	
Specifically,	they	show	how	photographs	of	Mrs	Thatcher	frequently	appear	on	the	front	cover,	and	
suggest	 these	 images	 body	 forth	what	 it	 is	 to	 age	 successfully.	 She	 appears	 in	middle	 age,	 full	 of	
vitality,	exuding	not	 just	health,	but	poise,	grooming	and	wealth,	each	performed	as	achievements:	
the	fruits	of	a	steely	reflexive	modern	relation	to	self	through	which	both	the	world	and	the	body	can	
be	managed	to	postpone	older	age.	The	irony	of	course	is	that	Thatcher	as	the	peon	of	the	possibility	
that	 the	 Third	 Age	 could	 be	 stretched	 indefinitely	 was	 later	 subsumed	 by	 AD.	 	 The	 achievement	
Featherstone	and	Hepworth	depict	involves	individuals	investing	well	in	their	bodies	as	well	as	their	
other	 possessions	 as	 the	 pinnacle	 of	 individualism,	 and	 reflexive	 management	 of	 self	 (see	 also	
Callero,	2013).		Here	I	want	to	stress	the	term	‘manage’	as	extruding	any	possibility	of	failure:	
	
In	contemporary	Western	culture,	we	are	encouraged	to	think	of	our	lives	as	coherent	stories	
of	success,	progress	and	movement.	Loss	and	failure	have	their	place	but	only	as	a	broader	
picture	of	ascendance.		The	steady	upward	curve	is	the	favoured	contour.	(Stacey,	1997:9	in	
Diedrich,	2007)		
	
This	 imaginary	 of	 successful	 ageing	 –	 as	 a	 lifecourse	 managed	 as	 a	 steady	 upward,	 rather	 than	
downward,	curve	–	is	represented	in	public	health	discourse	and	health	promotional	media	as	if	it	is	
available	 to	 everyone.	 Indeed,	 ‘everyone’	 is	 represented	 as	 capable	 of	 achieving	 a	 successful	 and	
prolonged	 third	 age.	 	 Critically,	 the	 fulfillment	 of	 this	 utopian	 project	 is	 represented	 as	 an	 urgent	
issue	 to	 ensure	 sustainable	 futures	 for	 ageing	 societies,	 “a	 future	 that	 takes	 full	 advantage	 of	 the	
powerful	resource	inherent	in	older	populations.”	(WHO	2011).		
	
Just	 think	 for	 a	 moment	 on	 the	 images	 and	 discourses	 in	 the	 media	 that	 endlessly	 promote	 the	
relation	between	active	and	healthy	lifestyles	and	successful	ageing.	We	are	immersed	in	images	that	
characterize	people	 in	middle	 age	 as	 always	doing	 –	 (running,	 rambling,	 going	on	holiday,	 smiling,	
interacting)	–	 they	are	never	static:	as	 if	a	continuously	active,	mobile	present	 is	what	will	keep	us	
youthful	and	postpone	old	age.		This	hopeful	imaginary	is	all	around	and	is	prolific	(Petersen,	2015).		
It	continuously	 incites	people	to	consume	(Hurd-Clark,	2010):	 to	buy	or	 to	 join	–	pension	schemes,	
anti-ageing	 creams	 and	 supplements,	 gyms,	 ramblers’	 clubs,	 bicycles,	 five	 fruits	 and	 veg	 a	 day,	
retirement	 homes	 –	 the	 list	 is	 endless.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time	we	 are	 bombarded	with	 new	 scientific	
breakthroughs	over	what	will	prevent	illness	and	disability	(4	hours	of	intense	exercise	each	week	–	
half	an	hour’s	walk	five	times	a	week;	just	walking!),	as	well	as	things	to	eat	(low	fat,	low	calorie;	high	
fat,	low	calorie;	more	vit	C,	less	Vit	C	–	superfoods	abounding	with	new	types	every	week)	(see	also	
Petersen	forthcoming).		Even	coffee	is	proselytized	as	giving	us	longer	life.	
	
Public	health	and	biomedical	messages	are	thus	coupled	with	a	culture	of	consumption	preoccupied	
with	health	and	youthfulness	(Schilling,	2002).	 	The	effect	 is	to	continuously	incite	consciousness	of	
the	 relationship	 between	 health,	 ageing	 and	 identity	 by	 thrusting	 us	 into	 the	 future	 at	 all	 times,	
putting	us	in	what	Heidegger	(2008)	calls	‘advance’	of	our	bodies	and	ourselves,	so	that	even	a	stroll	
in	 the	 countryside	 to	 a	 favorite	 spot	 becomes	 a	moment	 for	 enhancement,	 heath	 promotion	 and	
disease	prevention	as	we	contemplate	not	 the	extraordinary	 view	but	whether	we	are	walking	 far	
enough	and	fast	enough.		
	
Neilson	(2012)	suggests	this	as	a	“growing	pressure	for	ageing	subjects	to	perform	practices	of	self-
care”,	one	that	involves	an	existential	shift	because	it	is	a	“process	by	which	the	care	of	self	begins	to	
eclipse	the	care	of	others.”	(p.45).	Healthy	ageing	is	thus	being	increasingly	made	the	responsibility	of	
individuals	and	families	as	at	the	same	time	as	it	is	a	prime	marker	of	positive	identity.	Critically	then,	
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‘response-able’	 (Latimer	 1999;	 Latimer	 &	 Munro	 2015)	 persons	 need	 to	 be	 seen	 to	 answer	 the	
incitements	 and	 manage	 their	 ageing	 well,	 with	 what	 counts	 as	 successful	 ageing	 prefigured	 as	
specific	forms	of	personhood	–	active,	productive,	fit.		
	
The	 biopolitics	 of	 ageing	 is	 thus	 being	 reassembled	 in	ways	 that	 not	 only	 cut	 out	 how	 ageing	 is	 a	
relational	co-produced	effect,	but	also	seem	to	represent	a	shift:	from	the	othering	of	the	otherness	
that	 the	 old	 represent,	 to	 a	 phagic	 strategy	 that	 impels	 us	 to	 manage	 our	 ageing,	 ingest	 and	
assimilate	 it,	 and	 so	 change	 its	 very	 character,	 to	 prolong	 being	 and	 seeming	 to	 be	 younger,	
postponing	 the	onslaught	of	what	 the	 transhumanist	Nick	Bostrom	 (2005)	 calls	 the	ageing	dragon.	
Those	who	do	not	conform	are	not	just	at	risk	of	stigmatization,	they	are	at	risk	of	being	part	of	the	
parade	of	spectacles,	revolting	subjects,	and	monsters.	
	
The	Dementia	Monster	&	Being	Irresponse-able	
	
There	are	around	36	million	people	with	some	form	of	dementia	in	the	world	and	this	is	
expected	to	at	least	double	over	the	next	20	years,	making	it	one	?of	the	largest	neglected	
global	health	challenges	of	our	generation.	The	global	economic	cost	of	dementia	is	estimated	
at	over	US$600	billion,	and	Alzheimer’s	Society	research	suggests	that	in	the	UK,	one	in	three	
people	over	65	will	die	with	dementia.	This	is	not	something	any	of	us	can	afford	to	ignore.	
(Piet,	2012:	18)	
As	discussed	above	growing	old	badly	is	personified	by	the	figure	of	the	older	person	with	dementia.		
Until	 recently	dementia	has	not	been	of	much	 interest	 to	 clinical	 scientists.	 	 This	 is	partly	because	
dementias	 could	not	be	made	 visible	 as	 located	 in	 lesions	 in	 the	body,	 until	 post-mortem,	 so	 that	
diagnosis	 was	 clinical,	 arrived	 at	 through	 processes	 of	 differentiation	 (Bender,	 2003).	 In	 addition,	
dementias	 have	 been	 caught	 up	 in	 the	 inherent	 ageism	 of	 clinical	 medicine	 (Oliver	 2008),	 with	
dementia	being	constituted	as	intractable,	inevitable	and	as	a	policy	problem	to	be	managed,	rather	
than	as	a	proper	target	for	high-flying	clinical	research.		But	this	is	changing.			
	
The	alignment	of	 the	 ‘apocalyptic’	 (Robertson	1991)	demographic	predictions	of	 the	cost	of	ageing	
populations	plagued	by	dementia	(see	for	example,	WHO,	2015	&	Fig.	4)	together	with	revolutions	in	
brain	scanning	technology	that	allow	for	the	investigation	of	living	brains	(Shine	et	al,	2015)	and	post-
genomic	science	that	enables	the	genetic	profiling	of	neurodegenerative	diseases	(Tanzi	and	Bertram,	
2001),	 mean	 that	 dementia	 is	 becoming	 an	 increasingly	 potent	 site	 for	 both	 clinical	 and	 for	
technoscientific	 research	 (Milne,	 2017).	 Critically,	 we	 are	 witnessing	 how	 dementia	 is	 being	
reconstituted	across	the	biomedical	and	neurological	sciences	as	well	as	mainstream	psychology	to	
grow	 differential	 dementia	 diagnoses	 (Hillman	 and	 Latimer,	 forthcoming).	 The	 medicalizing	 of	
particular	 effects	 as	 different	 forms	 of	 dementia	 is	 ongoing	 with	 what	 Beard	 and	 Neary	 (2013)	
describe	as	“nosological	creep”.			
	
More	specifically,	brain	ageing,	like	ageing	more	generally	discussed	above,	is	beginning	to	be	opened	
up	as	a	site	of	prevention	and	enhancement	(Moreira	and	Bond,	2008).		A	new	frontier	of	scientific	
research	 is	 reconstituting	 the	 brain	 as	 much	 more	 plastic	 and	 malleable	 than	 originally	 thought	
(Williams	et	al,	2012),	with	hopes	and	expectations	that	have	gone	public:	
	
…scientists	 worldwide,	 working	 in	 many	 different	 specialities,	 have	 found	 that	 the	 human	
brain	 is	highly	plastic,	possessing	 the	ability	not	only	 to	 create	new	neurons,	but	 to	modify	
networks	of	neurons	to	better	cope	with	new	circumstances.	(DementiaToday,	2013)	
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Within	this	imaginary	dementia	is	the	effect	of	reduced	brain	plasticity	due,	for	example,	to	biological	
ageing.		Constructing	the	ageing-dementia	relation	in	this	way	begins	to	give	it	a	future.		For	example,	
it	becomes	something	that	 is	possibly	preventable,	with	the	public	being	 incited	to	keep	exercising	
their	 brains	 as	 a	 preventative	 strategy.	 Specifically,	 the	 tragic	 vision	 of	 the	 abject	 demented	 older	
person,	 such	 as	 Gladys,	 legitimates	 the	 enactment	 of	 specific	 values,	 namely	 the	 creation	 and	
capitalization	of	troubles	and	the	triumph	of	endeavor,	including	the	proliferation	of	science,	industry	
and	 innovation	 through	 which	 to	 overcome,	manage	 and	 transform	 dementia.	 	 It	 is	 not	 just	 that	
dementia	in	the	context	of	ageing	undoes	the	basis	of	what	it	is	to	be	fully	human,	of	personhood,	in	
terms	of	memory	and	its	loss	(Katz	and	Peters,	2008),	it	is	more	complex	than	that.			
	
Within	 biomedicine	 dementias	 are	 located	 as	 progressive	 or	 degenerative	 diseases	 of	 the	 brain	 in	
ways	that	increasingly	somaticize	mind	and	personhood	(Pickersgill,	2013;	Locke,	2014,	Moser,	2011).	
There	 are	 disputes	 around	 whether	 different	 kinds	 of	 dementia	 are	 the	 natural	 consequence	 of	
biological	decline,	or	whether	they	can	be	reframed	as	a	‘terminal	disease’	or	a	mental	health	issue	
(WHO,	 2015)	 –	 thereby,	 like	 cancer	 before	 it,	mainstreaming	 how	 dementia	 can	 and	 ought	 to	 be	
known	 and	 ‘disciplined’.	 This	 has	meant	 that	 the	 technoscientific	 pursuit	 of	 knowledge	 about	 and	
interventions	in	dementia	and	new	thinking	in	neuroscience	about	the	plasticity	of	the	brain	align	to	
form	a	‘neuroculture’	(Williams	et	al,	2012)	that	individuates	dementia	as	preventable	disease	or,	at	
the	very	least,	treatable.	
	
I	want	to	suggest	that	this	increasing	biomedicalization	of	dementia	–	including	notions	that	ageing,	
even	 the	 ageing	 brain,	 can	 be	managed	 –	 reinforce	 a	 phagic	 strategy	 to	 transform	 the	 ageing-
dementia	relation	through	ingestion	and	assimilation.		This	strategy	can	be	seen	in	the	reorganization	
of	 health	 services	 and	 research	 around	 a	 program	 for	 the	 ‘early	 detection	 of	 dementia’	 (Swallow,	
2016),	 and	 the	 constitution	 of	 a	 new	 category	 of	 prepatienthood,	 ‘mild	 cognitive	 impairment’	 (or	
MCI)	 (Katz	 &	 Peters,	 2008;	 Moreira,	 et	 al	 2009).	 It	 also	 includes,	 like	 ageing	 itself,	 a	 notion	 that	
dementia	can	be	modulated,	postponed	or	even	prevented,	provided	 individuals	 live	 the	 right	way	
(Peel,	 2014).	 So,	 there	 is	 the	 rub	 –	 the	 call	 for	 lifestyles	 and	 self-management	 strategies	 through	
which	to	nullify	the	potential	of	the	ageing-dementia	monster.		
	
The	shift	towards	reforming	ageing,	and	even	the	ageing-dementia	relation,	as	manageable	depends	
upon	 individuals	 responding	 to	 this	 call	 to	 the	 future	 and	 to	 ‘care	 for	 themselves’	 (as	 opposed	 to	
others).	In	this	sense	then	the	phagic	strategy	depends	upon	people	responding	to	the	call	to	master	
their	futures	through	their	‘strategic	conduct’	(Giddens,	1984)	of	the	present.		The	figure	of	the	aged	
demented	subject,	such	as	Gladys,	is	thus	also	a	subject	that	bodies	forth	the	figure	of	someone	who	
has	not	responded	to	this	call,	and	managed	their	ageing	well.		
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Fig	4.	The	Costs	of	Alzheimer’s	Disease	(Alzheimer’s	Disease	International,	2015:3)	
 
Dementia	 is	 frequently	 described	 as	 a	 neuro-degenerative	 disease.	 	 I	 want	 to	 suggest	 that	 in	 the	
contemporary	 moment	 the	 ageing-dementia	 relation	 enacts	 a	 profound	 sense	 of	 immorality.	
Specifically,	 the	dementia-ageing	 relation’s	monstrousness,	 its	 repulsiveness,	 comes	 from	how	 it	 is	
constructed	as	if	it	threatens	what	is	most	sacred	to	Euro-American	notions	of	personhood:	not	just	
the	imaginary	of	the	sovereign	subject,	or	even	one	who	is	merely	reasonable,	but	of	the	subject	who	
is	 response-able.	 So	 for	 example,	 to	 be	 a	 good	 somatic	 citizen	 (Rose	 and	 Novas,	 2004)	 requires	
someone	to	be	response-able.			
	
Here	I	am	building	on	my	own	earlier	work	that	I	referred	to	earlier	(Latimer	1999,	Latimer	&	Munro	
2015)	and	the	notion	of	personhood	as	situated	and	relational,	including	an	effect	of	being	‘response-
able’.		If	we	accept	that	personhood	is	not	a	possession,	but	situated,	then	we	can	also	suggest	that	
personhood	 is	 an	 effect	of	 being	 ‘response-able’:	 and	 as	 I	 have	 suggested	 above,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
relationship	 between	 ageing	 and	 persons,	 response-ability	 has	 very	 specific	 connotations.	 	 Being	
response-able	involves	what	Goffman	(1958)	describes	as	presentation	of	self,	which	depends	upon	
strategic	conduct	and	reading	and	doing	the	social	to	get	along	and	go	along	(Giddens,	1984);	what	
Garfinkel	(1967)	shows	as	doing	member,	including	being	accountable	and	making	actions	visible	and	
observable	as	rational	and	reasonable;	what	Foucault	and	others	have	shown	as	being	positioned	&	
being	emplaced	by	modes	of	ordering	as	well	as	having	the	know-how	of	when	and	how	to	resist	&	
transform	these	through	negotiation,	agonistics,	persuasion	(Foucault,	1991;	Lyotard,	1984;	Rabinow,	
&	Sullivan	1979).		
	
But	as	I	am	pressing	response-ability	here	it	has	an	added	cache:	it	includes	being	ready	and	available	
to	fold	into	the	next	call	to	the	future.	From	this	perspective	some	older	people	classified	as	having	
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dementia	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 ‘socially	 abject’	 (Tyler	 2013)	 not	 because	 of	 anything	 essential	 or	
inherent	 but	 because	 of	 how	 they	 are	 not	 performing	 themselves	 as	 response-able,	 of	 how	 they	
seem	to	refuse	and	repel	late	modern	modes	of	ordering	by	ageing	unsuccessfully.	To	put	it	another	
way	their	sensibility	and	experience	has	not	been	sufficiently	attuned	and	exercised	to	what	Adam	et	
al	(2009)	call	the	mode	anticipation:	
	
As	much	as	speculative	finance	has	become	both	a	dominant	mode	of	capital	accumulation,		
spawning	 its	 own	 material	 and	 discursive	 effects	 of	 disaster	 prediction,	 anticipation	 has	
become	 a	 common,	 lived	 affect-state	 of	 daily	 life,	 shaping	 regimes	 of	 self,	 health	 and	
spirituality.	(2009:	247)	
	
A	conundrum	then	–	through	being	response-able	and	maintaining	their	performativity	in	relation	to	
neoliberal	 world-making,	 for	 example,	 through	 self-care	 and	 the	 reflexive	 management	 of	 risk,		
people	as	they	age	can	maintain	their	 ‘status	honour’,	to	use	Weber’s	terminology.	 	But	as	Minkler	
and	 Holstein	 (2008)	 suggest	 this	 then	 acts	 to	 denigrate	 and	 throw	 into	 perspective	 those	 aged	
subjects	that	can	be	made	to	seem	abject.			
	
Following	 Skeggs,	 Tyler	 (2013)	 helps	 us	 to	 see	how	abject	 subjects	 are	 the	 effects	 of	 classificatory	
mechanisms	 through	 which	 specific	 body-persons	 become	 systematically	 defaced	 and	 devalued.		
What	she	goes	on	 to	show	 is	how	the	rubbishing	of	particular	kinds	of	body-persons	 is	because	of	
how	 they	 stand	 against	 particular	 neo-liberal	 institutions	 of	 identity	 and	 personhood,	 not	 least	 in	
terms	of	the	individuation	of	persons	as	discrete,	body	selves	in	ways	that	obscure	how	persons	are	
affects	 and	 effects	 of	 their	 ‘body-person-world’	 (Latimer,	 2011)	 relations.	Within	 this	 view	 people	
who	appear	as	abject	subjects	are	not	 just	the	effects	of	complex	entanglements	 in	the	alignments	
between	media,	public	health	discourse,	and	forms	of	governmentality	working	on	behalf	of	capital.		
We	can	see	how	the	prospect	and	anticipation	of	ageing,	and	the	creation	of	monsters	such	as	the	
figure	 of	 the	 aged	 person	 with	 dementia,	 both	 unconceals	 and	 intensifies	 the	 precariousness	 of	
contemporary	social	existence.		
	
	
Dwelling	Alongside	Dementia	as	‘a	Figure	Seen	Twice’	
	
The	figure	of	 the	older	demented	person	represents	something	sacred	that	has	become	despoiled,	
what	 is	 lost	 is	 even	more	precious	 than	 the	hollowing	out	of	 the	person,	 the	mind,	 the	 individual,	
their	self.		As	Taussig	asserts,	this	despoiling	is	‘attractive	in	its	very	repulsion’,	because	‘it	creates	the	
sacred	 even	 in	 the	 most	 secular	 of	 societies	 and	 circumstances’.	 Specifically,	 at	 moments	 what	
affronts	neo-liberal	world	making	is	the	abject	figure	of	the	old	demented	person	as	one	who	has	not	
managed	their	ageing,	its	repulsiveness	attracts	because	it	helps	recreate	what	is	most	sacred.		The	
figure	 of	 the	 old	 demented	 person	 is	 both	 an	 infraction	 of	 the	 sacred:	 it	 helps	 to	 recreate	 the	
possibility	that	man	can	and	should	manage	his	or	herself	–	body,	mind	and	all	–	as	a	phagic	strategy	
to	eliminate	the	otherness	that	‘bad’	ageing	represents.		
	
Bad	ageing,	like	poverty,	is	performed	as	the	failure	of	the	individual	because	of	how	they	fly	in	the	
face	of	contemporary	neoliberal	agendas:	 in	Bev	Skeggs	(2011)	terms	they	are	unable	to	(or	do	not	
want	to?)	embody	or	body	forth	neoliberal	values.		In	this	sense	then,	stigma	is	the	effect	and	affects	
of	 complex	 alignments:	 political,	 medical,	 cultural.	 Ageing,	 and	 the	 extraordinary	 proliferation	 of	
concern	and	excitation	of	interest	around	ageing	is	an	event	that	brings	to	the	surface	the	antithetical	
relation	between	growing	old	and	neoliberal	forms	of	personhood.		
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The	 inversion	 I	want	 to	propose	requires	us	 to	 ‘dwell	alongside’	 (Latimer	 forthcoming,	and	Latimer	
2013)	dementia.		Dwelling	alongside	is	a	way	of	being	with	and	becoming	with	the	ageing-dementia	
relation	and	be	affected	by	 it	 in	ways	 that	 challenge	dominant	 forms	of	what	 counts	as	 successful	
forms	of	personhood.			At	the	same	time	we	need	to	hold	onto	the	possibility	that	we	can	reassemble	
the	social	in	order	to	find	ways	to	bring	the	older	person	with	dementia	back	into	presence.	To	return	
for	a	moment	to	the	film	about	Gladys	Wilson,	discussed	earlier	in	the	paper,	maybe	Gladys	is	just	as	
fully	human	at	the	beginning	of	the	film,	but	simply	different?	In	other	words,	it	may	be	us,	and	even	
Naomi,	that	are	elsewhere	to	Gladys’	present	reality	–	to	her	way	of	being	in	the	world.	Within	this	
inversion	it	is	we	who	are	‘other’	by	virtue	of	the	long	duree	(Giddens	1984)	of	contemporary	forms	
of	 personhood.	 The	 anthropologist	 Clifford	Geertz	 (1973)	may	help	us	 to	 some	extent	 here.	 In	 his	
initial	encounters	with	the	Balinese	the	locals	seem	to	look	at	him	and	his	wife	as	if	it	is	they	‘who	are	
away’;	they	see	through	them	as	though	they	are	naught	but	the	air.	Yes,	at	the	beginning	of	the	film	
Gladys	 seems	 ‘away’,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	Old	 Fools,	 in	 Larkin’s	poem,	are	away	–	 they	are	 there	
rather	than	here.	But,	contrastingly,	drawing	on	Geertz’s	work,	we	have	to	consider	that	 it	may	be	
‘us’	that	are	elsewhere.		Us,	with	our	projects	and	our	futures	who	are	really	away?			
	
The	 opening	 for	 care	 that	 the	 film	 conveys	 thus	 constitutes	what	 Rudge	 (2011)	 calls	 a	 rupture	 of	
certainty.	It	is	not	just	that	there	is	no	way	of	knowing	for	sure	how	Gladys	feels	about	what	is	going	
on.	Of	course,	we	do	not	know	whether	 she	wants	 to	be	 refolded	 into	 the	present,	 ‘awakened’	as	
Saks	(2008)	might	put	it.	Rather,	what	I	want	to	press	is	how	the	deep	ambiguity	at	the	heart	of	the	
ageing-dementia	 relation	 is	 revealed	 –	 for	 a	 moment	 –	 through	 Gladys	 and	 Naomi	 becoming	
differently	 to	how	 they	were	previously	 shown	 to	us.	On	 the	one	hand	 then	can	we	cherish	 those	
with	dementia	as	‘other’	than	us?	And	on	the	other	can	we	begin	to	see,	with	Naomi,	that	the	effects	
of	 dementia	 that	 produce	 the	 figure	 of	 Gladys	 as	 isolated	 and	 disconnected	 are	 not	 so	much	 the	
inevitable	consequences	of	the	decline	and	deficit	caused	by	ageing	and	dementia,	but	perhaps	the	
effects	 of	 stigma	 and	 her	 emplacement?	 To	 use	 Donna	 Haraway’s	 (2005)	 terminology	 –	 this	 is	 a	
moment	of	‘reworlding’	in	which	the	dementia-ageing	relation	gets	figured	differently.		So	what	we	
need	to	acknowledge,	even	celebrate,	 is	how	this	kind	of	radical	relationality	entails	a	possibility	of	
‘dwelling	alongside’	(Latimer,	forthcoming)	those	figures	that	seem	most	stigmatized	–	and	so	open	
up	the	figure	of	the	ageing-dementia	relation	to	broader	perspectives.		
	
With	Michael	Halewood	(2016)	in	his	recent	paper	on	dementia,	I	am	pressing	the	need	to	see	people	
like	Gladys	differently	and	rethink	“what	kind	of	selves	we	all	 think	we	are”	(p.3).	This	may	 involve	
getting	beyond	old	binaries,	and	‘double	crossing’	(Munro	2016):	going	back	and	forth,	one	moment	
seeing	ageing	and	dementia	as	relational,	and	as	‘things’	we	can	affect	and	change;	and,	in	the	next,	
celebrating	other	 forms	of	 sociality	 that	 involve	different	ways	of	being	 in	 the	world	 to	 those	 that	
dominate.			
	
Conclusions	
	
I	started	the	paper	by	suggesting	that	there	 is	a	proliferation	of	media	representations	that	parade	
the	abject,	aged	dementia	subject,	to	bring	the	dementia-ageing	monster	into	existence	as	a	part	of	
the	everyday.		The	ageing-dementia	relation	is	stigmatizing	because	it	‘breaches’	as	Harold	Garfinkel	
(1967)	would	say	the	markers	and	signifiers	of	what	makes	someone	up	as	a	full	person.	Growing	old	
and	becoming	‘demented’	can	seem	to	put	someone	beyond	the	pale.		
	
After	Bauman	I	proposed	that	the	parade	of	the	dementia-ageing	monster	can	be	thought	of	not	just	
as	an	emic	strategy	for	vomiting	up	and	sequestrating	the	otherness	of	the	abject	older	person	with	
dementia.	 	 Rather	 the	 alignment	 of	 the	 parade	with	 a	 changing	 biopolitics	 of	 the	 dementia-aging	
15	
relation	that	I	have	described	can	be	understood	as	a	phagic	strategy	to	know,	ingest,	and	transform	
the	dangerous	and	monstrous	otherness	that	the	older	person	with	dementia	is	made	to	represent.			
	
The	 phagic	 strategy	 involves	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 dispositif	 (Foucault	 1980),	 an	 actor-network	 of	
associations	for	knowing,	detecting,	managing	and	transforming	dementia:	public	health	discourses	
promoting	healthy	ageing	associate	with	policies	such	as	early	detection	and	diagnosis	of	dementia,	a	
proliferation	 of	 technoscientific	 research,	 media	 representations	 and	 an	 anti-ageing	 culture	 of	
consumption	–	through	which	the	effects	identified	as	dementia	can	be	known,	transformed	or	even	
just	postponed,	providing	 individuals	are	response-able.	Being	a	 full	person	 in	 late	modern	times,	 I	
have	suggested,	goes	beyond	memory	and	reason	–	it	includes	health,	fitness	and	engagement,	and	
the	capacity	to	respond	to	the	call	to	transform	the	future	by	participating	in	the	active	and	strategic	
management	of	ageing.		
	
The	 ‘thinging	 up’	 (Larsen	 2013)	 of	 the	 dementia-ageing	 relation	 as	 something	 available	 to	
enhancement	is	I	am	arguing	occurring	against	a	background	of	the	parade	of	monsters.		Critically,	I	
suggest,	 this	 ‘double	 helix’	 is	 shifting	 dementia	 from	 simply	 being	 an	 object	 of	 disgust	 –	 to	 be	
shunned	and	excluded	in	processes	of	emesis	–	into	a	present	day	reality,	an	imminent	and	present	
danger,	which	can	and	will	be	ingested	and	assimilated:	transformed	by	biomedicine	and	the	social	
body,	as	at	the	same	time	as	it	is	transformative	of	the	social	body.	On	the	one	hand	then	the	ageing-
dementia	dispositif	 includes	 incitements	 for	 people	 to	 be	 response-able,	 stand	 in	 advance	of	 their	
ageing	bodies	and	be	proactive	to	prevent	and/or	postpone	both	ageing	and	dementia.	On	the	other	
it	is	the	relation	–	between	the	older	person	with	dementia	and	the	world	in	which	the	older	person	
finds	themselves	-	that	needs	reordering	to	find	ways	to	dwell	alongside	dementia.			
	
I	showed	you	Gladys	and	Naomi	Feil,	and	how	they	become	with	each	other	in	ways	that	mean	that	
dementia	is	different	from	what	it	was	before:	that	it	is	as	much	a	body-world	relation	as	it	is	a	state	
of	becoming	other.	 	 Perhaps	 the	ambiguity	 and	 conundrum	of	 the	ageing-dementia	 relation	mean	
that	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 a	 figure	 seen	 twice	 (Riles,	 2000):	 the	 figure	 of	 Gladys	 –	 isolated,	 alone	 and	
disconnected	–	‘elsewhere’	as	I	have	put	it	-	can	be	seen	as	an	effect	of	a	disease,	or	as	the	effect	of	
stigma:	 a	 body-world	 relation	where	 becoming	 the	 living	 dead	 of	 dementia	 is	 an	 effect	 of	 how	 a	
person	 is	 stigmatized,	emplaced	and	sequestrated	by	 the	biopolitics	of	 late	modern	capitalism.	 	As	
such	as	Feil	shows	us	we	need	to	find	ways	to	reincorporate	people	like	Gladys.		
	
But	 I	 proposed	 that	 there	 is	 yet	 another	way	 of	 seeing	 the	 figure	 of	Gladys	 –	 as	 someone	who	 is	
elsewhere,	different,	but	still	fully	human,	even	if	they	are	like	the	Old	Fools,	‘away’.	Franco	Berardi	
Bifo	(2014)	in	his	essay	“Exhaustion	and	Senile	Utopia	of	the	Coming	European	Insurrection”	suggests	
that	our	way	of	being	together	has	become	apathetic,	with	modern	culture	and	political	imagination	
emphasizing	“the	virtues	of	youth,	of	passion	and	of	energy,	aggressiveness	and	growth”	(p.537).	He	
suggests	that	capitalism	relies	on	the	exploitation	of	physical	energy,	with	‘semiocapitalism’:		
	
	.	 .	 subjugating	 the	 nervous	 energy	 of	 society	 to	 the	 point	 of	 collapse.	 	 The	 notion	 of	
exhaustion	has	always	been	anathema	to	the	discourse	of	modernity,	of	romantic	Sturm	and	
Drang,	of	the	Faustian	drive	to	immortality,	the	endless	thirst	for	economic	growth	and	profit,	
the	denial	of	organic	limits.”	(p.537).		
	
Thus	 there	 is	 the	 possibility	 that	 in	 our	 relation	 to	 Gladys	 as	 we	 first	 see	 her	 it	 is	 us	 who	 are	
elsewhere?		 	By	shifting	our	relations	to	the	characteristics	we	are	being	made	to	see	as	dementia,	
we	can	refigure	them	as	ways	of	being	in	the	world	differently,	and	as	such,	as	other	ways	of	being	
human.	 	Here	 I	 am	 suggesting	we	need	 to	make	 room	 for	 those	 characteristics	 and	ways	of	being	
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human	 that	 we	 are	 being	 made	 to	 see	 as	 the	 signs	 and	 symptoms	 of	 dementia.	 Solidarity	 with	
dementia	may	require	then	a	shift	in	perspective.	What	is	needed	here	is	very	nuanced.	Perhaps	we	
can	think	then	how	dwelling	alongside	dementia	is	about	seeing	the	sense	in	the	reality	and	world	of	
the	person	with	dementia,	becoming	more	competent	in	that	world	and	letting	the	person	who	they	
once	were,	 ‘go’,	at	 the	same	 time	as	 letting	 the	person	 they	are	becoming	dwell	with	us,	dwelling	
alongside	and	cherishing	their	difference.	Here	I	emphasize	the	importance	of	strategies	for	dwelling	
alongside	the	aged	as	a	possible	way	to	resist	the	dominant	forms	of	personhood	mobilized	 in	 late	
modern	capitalism,	and	which	"others"	those	no	longer	willing	or	able	to	be	response-able	and	fold	
themselves	into	its	demands.		
	
In	a	phagic	 reversal	of	dementia’s	 fortunes	 the	ageing-dementia	 relation	 is	becoming	 incorporated	
into	 the	 social	 body	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 helping	 to	 reassemble	 the	 social	 in	 order	 to	 transform	 the	
future.	 	 This	 involves	 the	 partial	 biomedicalization	 of	 the	 dementia-ageing	 relation	 alongside	 the	
circulation	of	hopes,	even	expectations,	that	the	otherness	that	marks	the	abject	dementia	subject	as	
‘bad	ageing’	can	be	postponed	and	even	eliminated.	This	includes	being	incited	today	to	be	response-
able	 and	 manage	 ageing	 in	 ways	 that	 keep	 the	 ageing-dementia	 monster	 at	 the	 door.	 The	
reassemblage	 of	 the	 dementia-ageing	 relation	 also	 includes	 opening	 up	 to	 dementia’s	 otherness,	
with	new	 institutions	and	media	 representations	 that	help	us	 trouble	and	even	undo	 specific	neo-
liberal	positionings	to	help	deconstruct	the	ageing-dementia	relation	as	itself	relational,	so	that	there	
are	 possibilities	 for	 finding	 ways	 to	 dwell	 alongside	 dementia,	 give	 it	 room,	 in	 moments	 of	
reworlding.	Here	I	have	in	mind	the	ways	 in	which	dementia	 is	being	partially	transformed	through	
how	 it	 is	 reshaping	 the	 social	 body,	 including	 such	 entities	 as	 dementia	 friendly	 communities,	
dementia	 villages,	 and	 Alzheimer’s	 choirs.	 	 What	 is	 interesting	 here	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	
sequestrate	or	assimilate	dementia.		
	
	
Specifically,	then	I	am	suggesting	a	sensibility	that	does	not	simply	reproduce	old	binaries	between	
social	 and	biomedical	 representations	 and	 interventions	 in	 dementia,	 especially	 those	 that	 dismiss	
the	 biomedicalization	 of	 dementia	 (Lyman	 1989).	 	 Rather	 there	 is	 a	 need	 at	 the	 very	 least	 to	
illuminate	differences	between	when	it	is	a	disease	that	is	making	someone	be	the	ways	that	they	are	
being,	when	it	is	the	lack	of	fit	between	them	and	the	world-making	they	are	emplaced	by	and	when	
it	 is	 them	becoming	differently.	 I	want	to	suggest	then	what	 is	required	by	us	 is	to	dwell	alongside	
those	other	ways	of	being	in	the	world	-	slowness,	immobility,	degeneration,	confusion,	impotency,	
even	 chaos.	 	We	 know	 from	 so	many	 carers	 how	 dementia	 disorders	 the	modes	 of	 ordering	 that	
underpin	our	 living	 together	 in	 the	world,	and	 that	can	 include	our	own	as	 thinkers,	 scientists	and	
researchers.	This	means	finding	ways	to	dwell	alongside	what	we	are	being	made	to	see	as	a	clouding	
of	 the	 light	 of	 the	 enlightenment.	 	 Attempts	 to	 eradicate	 the	 otherness	 of	 the	 ageing-dementia	
relation,	and	dispose	of	dementia	or	at	least	bring	dementia	to	heel,	are	not	necessarily	problematic	
in	 themselves,	 they	 are	 problematic	when	 they	 deny	ways	 to	 challenge	 those	dominant	modes	 of	
ordering,	 and	 perhaps	 what	 positions	 the	 aged	 and	 the	 demented,	 that	 co-creates	 or	 at	 least	
intensifies	dementia.			
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